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Abstract This article discusses performance in the context of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Applying the framework by Gutner and Thompson and
inspired by principal-agent theory, it is argued that existing studies have under-
specified the institutional milieu that affects performance. The WTO represents a
member-driven organization where Members are part of the international organ-
ization (IO) (e.g., through rule-making) and at the same time act outside the IO (e.g.,
through implementation). Thus, a narrow reading of the IO (focusing on the civil
servants and the Director-General and his staff) will not suffice to understand IO
performance in the WTO context. Selected evidence is presented to illustrate aspects
of the WTO’s inner-working and the institutional milieu of performance. In addition,
the article discusses a number of performance parameters, including the relationship
between Secretariat autonomy and performance, the role of information, and the
mechanisms of performance aggregation. The article ends by cautioning against
quick fixes to the system to improve performance.
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1 Introduction
The recent history of trade negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO)
is full of anecdotal evidence of some sort of underperformance. The negotiation
machinery has achieved little since a number of sector services agreements were
concluded in 1997.1 In the current trade round (called the Doha Development
Rev Int Organ (2010) 5:345–363
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1These include the 4th protocol on basic telecommunication and 5th protocol on financial services.
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Agenda), the WTO has stumbled from one missed deadline to the next. Not
surprisingly, when organizations fail to deliver aspired outputs, explanations abound
as to who is responsible for the meager results. The negotiation platform is probably
the most prominent location to study performance in the context of the WTO;
however, in order to assess overall performance of the Geneva-based organization,
the article suggests taking a closer look at the overall institutional setting and the key
tasks the organization carries out.
I argue that existing studies underspecify the institutional milieu that affects
performance.2 In particular, theWTO functions as a member-driven organization where
Members are part of the international organization (IO) (e.g., through rule-making) and
at the same time act outside the IO (e.g., through implementation). In addition, a variety
of actors outside the WTO can significantly impact its performance. In the context of
implementation, national civil servants, business communities, political parties, and
non-governmental groups will interpret, apply or contest rules emanating from the
WTO in various ways. Thus, a narrow reading of the IO (focusing on the civil servants
and the Director-General (DG)) will not suffice to understand WTO performance.
This article provides a conceptual framework for how to approach the WTO’s
performance. In light of the research strategies stipulated by Gutner and Thompson
(2010) in this issue, this article suggests a four step approach to analyzing WTO
performance: first, a diagnosis of the objectives and tasks (the baseline); second, a
description of the delegated means (mandate, budgets, personnel, discretion) to those
who shall carry out a certain task with a special emphasis on the institutional
constraints (the institutional milieu); third, an evaluation of the underlying material
or social drivers (sources of performance); and fourth, a judgment of how well tasks
are carried out and how all outputs add up (task-specific and aggregation effects).
This article focuses in particular on steps 1 and 2 and discusses aggregation effects.
The article is structured as follows: First, a short review of the literature on WTO
performance is presented. This is followed by a discussion on performance
objectives. Third, a principal-agent (PA) framework is used as an analytical tool to
highlight the different institutional relationships within the WTO. Selected evidence
is presented to illustrate aspects of the WTO’s inner-workings and the institutional
milieu of performance. Fourth, a number of performance parameters are discussed,
including the relationship between Secretariat autonomy and performance, the role
of information, and the mechanisms of performance aggregation. The article ends
with a brief discussion on the implications of the analysis for current reform debates.
2 Current Literature
Studies related to the role of the WTO in global trade cooperation have hitherto been
dominated by what could be called grand bargains analysis, impact studies and
research on the functioning of the dispute settlement system. Performance has been
part of these various strands and research programs, albeit in implicit ways. Below, a
brief overview illustrates the variety of approaches and how they relate to the
performance metrics (Gutner and Thompson 2010).
2 Milieu is understood here predominantly within a rationalist perspective.
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First, grand bargains analysis refers to studies addressing the core business of the
WTO: improvement of market access and non-discriminatory treatment of exporters
and their products. Much emphasis has been placed on factors that explain outcomes
in subsequent trade rounds, including “go-it-alone power,” market forces, negotia-
tion strategies, coalition activities or ideational power (e.g., Gruber 2000; Steinberg
2002; Ostry 2002; Narlikar 2003). Trade rounds have been drivers for regulatory
adjustments and have affected the competitiveness of various economic sectors
leading to changes in relative welfare.3 Thus, this work can be situated towards the
outcome-side of the performance continuum. In this context, it is largely undisputed
that the last round (the Uruguay Round) brought substantial liberalization in many
markets, broadened the coverage of issues and added more stringent rules.4 Other
work on negotiations focuses on explaining particular events, such as sector
agreements, the terms of accession for new Members, Ministerial conferences, and
negotiations on specific issues.5 These selected outputs can be situated around the
middle of the performance metrics.
Second, impact studies have been carried out at various levels. On the macro-
level, the recent debate on the effects of GATT/WTO membership on trade flows
stands out (Rose 2004; Goldstein et al. 2007). Andrew Rose (2004) has stirred the
waters of the trade community through a number of quantitative studies that question
the conventional wisdom that GATT/WTO membership increases trade volumes in a
statistically significant way. Goldstein et al. (2007) show that there are measurable
effects of the GATT/WTO system on trade flows, when the analysis controls for
institutional standing of non-members (rights and obligations similar to contracting
parties) and their institutional embeddedness through auxiliary commercial arrange-
ments (e.g., preference schemes). This literature addresses outcome-based concerns
about performance. At the micro-level there are many case studies that explore the
effects of WTO obligations on the domestic level (e.g., intellectual property rights,
reduction of tariff or non-tariff barriers). This work can be placed around the
intermediate outputs of the metrics’ continuum.
Third, most of the literature on the WTO and how it performs has focused on
dispute settlement. This work has looked at the effects of an increasingly legalized
system on dispute initiation and dispute resolution. Particular attention has been
devoted to the alleged existence of a structural bias against developing countries’
participation. Overall evidence is mixed, while controlling for trade flows as a proxy
for expected disputes, some scholars find evidence of lack of legal resources while
others suggest power asymmetry as the key factor for explaining the number of
actual cases launched (Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Guzman and Simmons 2005; Kim
2008; Bown 2009; Sattler and Bernauer 2010). In addition, some work has focused
4 There have been many critical studies focusing on welfare transfer from the South to the North resulting
from the Uruguay Round, e.g., Finger and Nogués (2002).
5 Examples include case studies on the negotiations that brought about a public health related opt-out from
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), e.g., Drezner (2007).
3 It is important to stress that trade rounds produced unequal welfare effects across and within countries. In
addition, the focus on the cooperation problems has shifted over time from negative integration (e.g., tariff
reductions, tackling protectionism in agricultural markets, offsetting unilateralism) to positive integration
(e.g., compatible technical regulations, the protection of intellectual property rights, stronger dispute
settlement).
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on the dynamic effects of a legalized system on the (future) willingness of actors to
engage in additional liberalization (Goldstein and Martin 2000). The work on
dispute settlement ranges along the performance metrics. Studies that look at legal
capacity of actors and effects of existing processes of dispute settlement are situated
around the process side of the performance metrics; other more systematic work that
addresses behavior and overall compliance tackles performance towards the right
hand side of the performance spectrum (from intermediate to macro outputs).6
The ways that the institutional milieu impacts performance is underspecified in
the current literature. This article attempts to contribute to the closing of this gap.
3 The WTO: What is to Be Performed?
While theoretical explanations from institutional economics and international relations
can be helpful in understanding the role of IOs in economic cooperation, they do not
offer easy guidance on how to develop performance indicators.7 Establishing a baseline
to assess the WTO is difficult (Elsig 2007a). Various impeding elements discussed by
Gutner and Thompson (2010) coincide; in particular, an important “eye of the
beholder” problem and the existence of broad and ambiguous objectives stand out.
There are diverging views as to how negotiations should address the concerns of the
parties involved. There is also disagreement over whether and to what degree the
WTO should address non-trade concerns.
In order to approach the “baseline” for performance assessment, I start with a brief
look at the treaty texts (in particular the preamble of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)/WTO treaties). If we contrast the preamble of the 1947 GATT treaty
with that of the agreement that led to the creation of the WTO in 1994, we observe some
stable expectations as to trade being an important instrument to help raise standards of
living, ensure full employment and increase real incomes (macro performance).8 If we
compare the preamble texts at these two points in time, we notice two new concerns:
addressing sustainable development and paying special attention to developing
countries.9 Some of the macro goals are measurable, such as employment and income
levels. Yet, it is far from obvious how to isolate the effects produced by WTO
membership from the other factors explaining these outcomes.10 Other goals, such as
7 For an overview on economic, international relations and legal explanations for the need of a multilateral
trade institution, see World Trade Report (World Trade Organization 2007).
8 Recognizing that their relations (…) should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand
(…) and expanding the production and exchange of goods; being desirous of contributing to these
objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce (www.wto.org).
9 Recognizing further that there is a need (…) to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade (…) (www.wto.org).
10 Many studies also suggest that trade liberalization has occurred mainly in unilateral terms or in the
regional context, but less through the WTO (World Bank 2005).
6 Some recent work on capacity constraints combines process and output measures; see for instance Busch
et al. (2008).
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sustainable development, will make performance assessment an even more contentious
exercise due to obvious limits to conceptualizing and measuring “sustainability.” In a
nutshell, the preamble’s objectives are too ambitious and ambiguous to be used as a
baseline (a problem found in other IOs’ core treaty texts as well).
Another set of potential performance baselines could be derived from WTO
guiding “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner 1983: 2; Ruggie 1982). These tools (e.g.,
the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause) contribute towards achieving the above
macro objectives. MFN has been an important norm in the successive rounds of
trade negotiations to lower tariffs.11 Another example is the “national treatment”
norm which has become more important in recent years as trade obstacles are
increasingly found behind the border.12 In addition, the key organizing rule for
negotiations is the reduction of barriers to trade in a reciprocal way as noted
explicitly in the preamble texts. More recently (and often in opposition to reciprocity
and MFN), we have witnessed the re-emergence of a “special and differential
treatment” norm. This norm affects expectations related to finding flexible solutions
in light of different stages of development. Yet, the regime’s norms and rules are not
attractive performance indicators. They are not easily operationalized (e.g., special
treatment) or suffer from important legally agreed exceptions (e.g., Art XXIV
allowing for regional and bilateral trade agreements violating the MFN norm).
Objectives that might be better suited for addressing the “baseline” are goals that
seem within reach of the organization and relate to what Gutner and Thompson (2010)
call “intermediate goals.” These objectives (while not explicitly listed in the treaties)
include dispute solving (avoiding trade wars), fending off unilateralism, assuring a
level playing field, providing export opportunities, and addressing non-trade
concerns. Whereas WTO Members might generally agree on the intermediate goals,
they attach different importance to the above issues. A small vulnerable economy
might not be too concerned with dispute settlement, as it is usually not “taken to
court” and acting as plaintiff is not a credible option for a variety of economic and
political reasons (Bown and Hoekman 2008). Such a country is more likely to
concentrate its efforts on level playing field issues, such as technical assistance and
capacity building or on changing particular rules to reap more benefits from the
trading system. A more competitive industrialized country might attach more
importance to the question of fending off unilateralism, illustrated by the position
adopted by Japan during the Uruguay Round negotiations when aggressive US trade
measures were a major concern. Thus, Japan opted for constraining unilateral trade
measures. This was done by pushing for more stringent rules, a stronger dispute
settlement system and the agreement by the US (and the entire membership) to stay
within agreed processes and rules and to abstain from unilateralism.13 Finally,
11 The MFN norm calls for non-discrimination between one’s trading partners. Various MFN exceptions
exist, e.g., the enabling clause for a special treatment of developing countries, Art XXIV on regionalism,
the long-used practice of providing “waivers” for “temporal” non-compliance, etc.
12 The national treatment norm stipulates that foreign produced goods cannot be discriminated against
once they have entered the country (for example, an excise tax applicable only to imported goods would
be illegal).
13 A key concern for Japan during the Uruguay Round in the area of the dispute settlement system was to
tame US unilateralism, Interview with a former Japanese trade negotiator, 21 May 2010.
The World Trade Organization at work 349
general consensus breaks down when shared “intermediate goals” are tested in
contexts where negotiators face strong opposition from domestic interest groups.
Trade policy is generally very difficult to isolate from broader domestic politics.
Against the background of diverging interests and conflicting preferences, the so-
called “eye of the beholder” problem is most acute.
Additional factors complicate the search for baselines. Following the creation of
the WTO, a redesigned dispute settlement system with stronger enforcement
mechanisms to induce compliance with rulings (e.g., quasi automatic adoption of
reports written by the panels and the Appellate Body (AB), potential recourse to
sanctions by the complainant party in case of non-compliance) led actors in the late
1990s to consider channeling many trade-related issues away from particular
organizations dealing with these (e.g., intellectual property rights, environmental
standards) to the newly created institution. As a result, the tasks have mushroomed
and the regulatory trading system continues to expand.14 Finally, negotiators often
agree on imprecise treaty texts or leave issues unsettled to move the process forward
and to overcome deadlocks. Yet, “strategic ambiguity” in relation to obligations
leads to different interpretations and expectations by parties. The above factors make
performance assessment a tricky exercise.
Given the disagreement over the exact baseline for performance measurement, I
suggest putting the focus on the four domains in which the WTO offers concrete
services. These are 1) a negotiation platform; 2) a forum to settle disputes; 3) regime
management-related tasks (implementation and reviewing national trade policies);
and 4) technical assistance and training activities. Below, I attempt to unpack the
organization and focus on the institutional milieu that affects process and output
performance. Such an institutional snapshot provides us with a more realistic
appreciation as to the internal conditions that affect performance of the organization.
4 Principal-Agent Relationships in the WTO
4.1 Complex Agency: Various Actor Constellations
I suggest looking at the WTO through the prism of a set of conceptual tools that
developed within the PA literature. PA helps locate actors, depict hierarchical
relationships within a political system, and trace evolving principal and agent costs
(Nielson and Tierney 2003; Gutner 2005; Hawkins et al. 2006; Thompson 2006;
Elsig 2007b, 2010). Such an approach maps responsibilities allocated in the system
and addresses the issue of who is managing performance. Unpacking the WTO’s
institutional milieu helps capture the role of various actors that are jointly (in
symbiosis or in conflict) engaged in WTO activities. Figure 1 sketches key PA
relationships (PARs) in the WTO.
In a member-driven organization, such as the WTO, the role of the proximate
principal (PP) (the ambassadors based in Geneva) is important for understanding the
14 The WTO has moved towards addressing non-tariff barriers, trade-related concerns (e.g., investment,
competition) and non-trade concerns (e.g., human rights, environment, and development).
350 M. Elsig
evolving politics. The PPs not only transmit and filter interests from national
constituencies (individual principals), they also act as a police patrol on behalf of the
collective principals (the collective decision-making forum of ministers), and possess
some discretion to delegate (and control) tasks to the DG and Secretariat officials. In
addition, by running the negotiations, the PPs need also to be conceptualized as part
of an IO (Elsig 2010). Such a conceptualization calls for some caution in analytically
separating internal and external sources of performance (Gutner and Thompson
2010). I suggest focusing on the PP as an actor at the interface between internal and
external. Below, I map important PARs and highlight contractual relations within a
“complex agency.”15
In PAR①, the sovereign principals are represented by the ministers who usually
meet every 2 years in Ministerial negotiations. Ministers convene to decide on
addressing deadlocks in negotiations or to settle on issues of institutional design. The
ministers are the prime body to accept the outcomes of negotiations (pre-cooked by the
PPs and negotiated in small circles) and are asked to address the most contentious
issues, usually done through horse-trading during Ministerial Conferences.16 In the
most recent (concluded) constitutional reform negotiations (the Uruguay Round),
Ministers accepted a grand reform of the dispute settlement system creating a two-
step litigation procedure. On top of the existing GATT panel structure, an additional
judicial body was designed to allow parties to appeal panel decisions. Moreover,
while the decision-making rules remained formally untouched, the WTO Members
abstained from clearly defining the roles of the DG and the Secretariat staff and























Fig. 1 Sovereign principals and complex agency (adopted and expanded from Elsig 2010); the arrows
represent delegation from a principal to an agent
16 Between Ministerial Conferences more restricted circles where only a handful of ministers may
participate are used in an attempt to unblock negotiations.
15 I focus on formal PARs, where the principals can delegate, control and sanction based on a “contract.”
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PAR② depicts the relationship between ministries in country capitals and their
representatives in the Geneva missions to the WTO.17 These representatives (the
PPs) act as a collective group in a number of Committees that manage the
organization. The most important day-to-day decision-making body where ambas-
sadors meet is the General Council. Another key Committee is the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) that oversees the work of the dispute settlement institutions
and engages in ongoing reflections on reform. All bodies are chaired by ambassadors
for the duration of 1 year and it has become accepted practice that the chair person of
the DSB is quasi automatically selected by the Members to chair the General
Council.18 There exist different types of delegation and control mechanisms
managing individual capital-mission relations. One of the most stringent oversight
control system exists in the US case. The US Congress (and its Committees dealing
with trade issues) closely watches the actions of its individual PP (the USTR Geneva
office). The Congress is “assisted” by domestic interest groups that follow trade
policy closely (a type of “fire-alarm” tool as a complement to other control
mechanisms). In many developing country cases, the control from the capital is far
less stringent and creates greater autonomy for the ambassadors (Elsig 2010).
PAR③ illustrates the two-step litigation process, with variance in delegation and
agent logics in the panel and the appeal stages. In the first stage, a group of three
panelists who are mandated to rule on a case are chosen on an ad hoc basis by the WTO
Members. These panelists are screened before appointment.19 Re-appointment depends
largely on how panelists have “performed” in the past.20 In the second stage (the
appeal institution) members are appointed for a term of 4 years, renewable once.21 AB
decisions are not likely to be overturned given high thresholds for re-interpretation or
non-acceptance by Members, increasing the autonomy for AB members.22 However,
as ex post control is limited, principals invest some time in selecting candidates (ex
ante screening). Interviews with actors involved in the selection procedures confirm an
intensification of screening activities over time (Elsig and Pollack 2010).
PARs 4–6 depict the politics within the WTO in a narrow reading of agency. The
WTO agreement is vague on the formal rules governing these relations.23 PAR④
18 Interview with a former ambassador and Chair of the General Council and the DSB, 17 June 2010.
19 In case of conflict over appointing panelists, the DG holds a special right to force selection.
20 Re-appointment of a panelist is influenced by external factors (the disputing parties accept the expert)
and by internal factors (the panelist is perceived as a team player and is not acting too “autonomously”),
see also Shoyer (2003), and Davey (2003).
21 Other authors attribute a trustee position to the AB (e.g., Alter 2008); see also Grant and Keohane (2005).
22 As AB members are subject to a re-appointment procedure there exists after 4 years an ex post control
tool for Members.
17 In 2009, 20 Members of the WTO lacked direct representation through a Geneva-based ambassador.
23 The 1994 Agreement Establishing the WTO (Article VI) reads: 1.There shall be a Secretariat of the
WTO (...) headed by a Director-General; 2. The Ministerial Conference shall appoint the Director-General
and adopt regulations setting out the powers, duties, conditions of service and term of office of the
Director-General; 3. The Director-General shall appoint the members of the staff of the Secretariat and
determine their duties and conditions of service in accordance with regulations adopted by the Ministerial
Conference; 4. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff of the Secretariat shall be
exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties, the Director-General and the staff of
the Secretariat shall not seek or accept instructions from any government or any other authority external to
the WTO (...).
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describes the relationship between the PPs and the DG. The DG is appointed for
4 years (one re-appointment is possible), but the treaties are incomplete as to the
exact rights and obligations.24 This leaves substantial discretion to the PPs
individually and as a collective principal to manage their relations with the DG
(Elsig 2010). PAR⑤ defines the relationship between the DG and the Secretariat
staff. The DG is expected to run the Secretariat and is also accountable vis-à-vis the
WTO Members for its activities. The DG appoints Directors and oversees the work
of the Secretariat. Finally, PAR⑥ focuses on the link between PPs and the
Secretariat. This does not represent a formal PAR as PPs have no rights in appointing
Secretariat officials and cannot sanction the civil servants directly.25 Yet, the treaties
request civil servants to work closely with the Members of the organization. In
particular, they are asked to assist the PPs. Given a strong PP dominance in
negotiations, these non-contractual relations are important in understanding overall
performance.
4.2 The Institutional Milieu and WTO Tasks
The institutional milieu differs across WTO functions (negotiations, dispute
settlement, regime management, or technical assistance and capacity building). For
each task the WTO carries out, we need to focus on the pivotal actors and their
autonomy and preferences. Below, I look through the lens of the agent in a narrow
sense (the Secretariat). The Secretariat for this purpose is defined as comprising the
DG and the Secretariat staff. I briefly assess the Secretariat’s autonomy (and its
potential for influence) across functions.26 Table 1 provides an overview of key tasks
carried out by the DG/Secretariat staff across organizational activities. In addition,
other key actors are listed and their role is given a value between 1 and 3 (from weak
and intermediate influence to strong influence).
In the realm of negotiations, the key actors are the PPs.27 They table proposals
and chair the negotiation committees. WTO staff from different Secretariat Divisions
assists the various chairs and the Members of the organization (if asked to do so). A
special role is played by the DG who acts as facilitator and can use some influence
through the position as the Chair of the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) (see
Odell 2005).28 In this capacity, the DG convenes meetings with heads of delegations,
holds informal gatherings and participates as observer in small group negotiations,
de facto representing the entire membership. The DG also runs the Ministerial
Meeting jointly with the representative of the host governments. Empirical evidence
suggests that the role of the DG and the WTO staff in negotiations is limited and has
somewhat decreased over time (Winham 1986; Elsig 2010).
24 See procedures to appoint the DG, Doc WT/L/509, 20 January 2003, http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/509.doc.
25 It is not unusual for PPs to try to pressure the DG to appoint specific candidates, interview with a
former DG, 8 November 2007.
26 The focus is on the Secretariat as it is involved in the four areas defined.
27 On the role of the Secretariat in negotiations, see Elsig (2010).
28 Yet, the TNC operates under the authority of the General Council (the most important Committee
composed of PPs).
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The influence of the Secretariat in dispute settlement is more pronounced, yet
difficult to measure. Two players stand out: the Legal Division staff (including
regular staff) advising panelists, and a specialized legal office assisting the AB (AB
Secretariat).29 Little is known about the WTO staffers who assist panels and the AB.
Some authors have argued that these legal officers have substantial influence. Joseph
Weiler posits in relation to panels that the drafting of reports is dominated by the
Secretariat. The style of the reports “often shades the truth in that the legal
deliberation will often have taken place between legal secretary and other members
of the Secretariat and not, in any meaningful sense within the Panel” (2001: 197).
The Secretariat dominates the process as in most cases it benefits from legal
expertise (information asymmetry) and it can devote more time to working for the
panels than the panelists themselves. “De facto, inevitably and importantly, they are
the repository of institutional memory, of horizontal and temporal coherence, of long
term hermeneutic strategy” (2001: 205).30 In addition, in panel proceedings, the
legal division influences the choice of panelists and it is hardly conceivable that the
Secretariat suggests panelists with whom working relations are strained. Key
characteristics to be selected seem to be availability, solid knowledge of the issues
involved, perceived neutrality and past record of constructive engagement.31 Even
29 While the AB members are selected by the Members, the AB Secretariat is selected by the DG (in
consultation with the AB members), e-mail exchange with an AB member, 3 July 2010.
30 Weiler continues: “Like in Freud’s dream theory certain things just have to come out. The views of the
Secretariat as to the proper outcome of a dispute will, thus, come out and more invidiously will be
consciously and subconsciously pushed upon the Panel” (2001: 205).
31 The DG is increasingly involved in the selection process, as parties do not accept proposed panelists.
Table 1 The role of the Secretariat in various areas










Stage 1: DG (1)
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Staff (1) Members’ Ministries (3)
DG (1)
Regime management II
(e.g., Trade Policy Review)




Advice & Training Staff (2) Other groups (3)
DG (1)
1 indicates weak influence, 2 intermediate influence, 3 strong influence
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less is known about the “assistance” of the AB Secretariat working with AB
members. Yet, there is general consensus that the influence of various legal advisors
to panels (and to the AB) has not decreased as the system has become more legalized
(and potentially more constraining).32
A large part of the daily work of the Secretariat involves regime management
functions (Thompson and Snidal 2005). These include administrating implementation-
related WTO commitments and the surveillance of national trade policies (Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)). Implementation of the agreements is the daily
business of various Committees, where the Secretariat assists the chairs.33 One aspect
of implementation is the obligation of the WTO Members to notify a defined number
of trade policy measures (e.g., new regulations or preferential trade agreements). The
Secretariat compiles these types of information and makes them available. The
Secretariat’s autonomy is larger in designing and running the TPRM than in the other
regime management activities described above. This type of peer-pressure exercise
informs the entire membership (and beyond) on good and bad practices in national
trade policy. It increases overall transparency. It was not until 1977 that the Secretariat
started reporting on a regular basis (Blackhurst 1998: 42). During the Uruguay Round
negotiations, contracting parties were in favor of a more institutionalized process, but
disagreed on the degree of autonomy to be granted to the Secretariat. Some were of
the view that the Secretariat should confine itself to listing information without making
any judgment, leaving the final assessment to the countries under review. In addition,
they pushed to prohibit the Secretariat from visiting capitals for data collection
purposes (Croome 1995). While these positions did not prevail, other control
mechanisms were installed, such as the obligation to submit two reports, one by the
Secretariat and one by the country under assessment. Over time, the Secretariat has
increased its autonomy by designing and managing the assessment process and by
enlarging the scope of topics under review. At the same time, the countries’ own
reports have never attained the importance expected by the principals. They have
shrunk in size and relevance over time.34
Finally, technical assistance and training activities have increased in importance
since the end of the 1990s.35 While many Members often mention that the WTO is
not a development institution, the external funds for this mandate have substantially
increased (on the origins see Blackhurst 1998). The main goals are to get developing
countries (and especially LDCs) accustomed to the rules of the system and to assist
34 Interview with senior WTO official, 31 January 2007.
35 However, the WTO is only one player among many in providing trade-related technical assistance and
capacity building. A growing number of intergovernmental organizations (e.g., South Centre,
Commonwealth Secretariat) and non-governmental organizations offer their services to developing
countries. In addition, the WTO joins forces and collaborates in capacity building with other
organizations. The WTO participates in various inter-agency efforts, including Aid for Trade, the
Enhanced Integrated Framework, and Trade Facilitation. The WTO often plays an “orchestrating” role in
this area; see Abbott and Snidal (2010).
32 Members have substantial influence as they take the decision to launch a case and in most cases attempt
to find a solution prior to the start of litigation. In addition, for many WTO Members the role of the private
sector is pivotal for litigation (see Shaffer 2003).
33 See Footer (2006) for an overview of different Committees.
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them in participating in negotiations. Whereas a number of Members attempt to
influence the use of funds for specific activities (e.g., earmarking), the Secretariat
still has sufficient wiggle-room in responding to demand.36
5 WTO Performance in a Member-Driven Environment
PA frameworks are helpful in highlighting various actor constellations within a
political system and in conceptually preparing the ground for exploring the material
and social drivers of the various principals and agents, their strategic use of
resources, and the agent and principal costs that develop. Below, I focus on three
specific questions related to analyzing WTO performance: 1) is there a relationship
between agent autonomy and performance? 2) what is the role of information in
various fields of WTO activity? and 3) how do different process and output
performance measures contribute to overall performance?
5.1 Autonomy of the Secretariat and Performance
The above discussion suggests that there is substantial variance as to the Secretariat’s
autonomy across activities. The more we move towards the upper half of the
“pyramid of performance” (see Figure 2 in Gutner and Thompson 2010), the less
autonomy and thus influence can be attributed to the Secretariat (the agent in a
narrow sense). Put differently, we could also understand the degree of autonomy or
influence of the IO agent as a function of politicization of various delegated tasks. In
the area of negotiations—which has the greatest potential to contribute to improving
performance from the macro perspective—the member-driven nature of the system is
most evident. Thus, the sources of good or bad performance need to be investigated
on the principal side and the interests and ideas of the Secretariat are of secondary
importance. It is hard to find any evidence of the Secretariat contributing to good or
bad performance in negotiations due to the lack of its influence (Elsig 2010).
Towards the bottom of the performance pyramid (e.g., technical assistance, trade
policy review), the Secretariat plays a more prominent role and needs to be closely
analyzed as an actor in determining good or bad performance. Based on existing
evaluations of WTO-provided training and technical assistance, little concern over
bad performance can be detected on this micro-level function (see below). Yet, there
exists a general research gap on the micro-level functions of the WTO.
A related question is whether more autonomy or influence of the Secretariat leads
to better or worse performance. This question is harder to tackle and calls for other
research strategies. These could include the carrying out of a counterfactual analysis,
a comparison across IOs with similar tasks (e.g., on dispute settlement or reporting),
or an in-depth study on how tasks have been carried out over time given varying
degrees of autonomy and changing institutional milieus.37 If we focus on tasks
37 As tasks within the WTO are situated alongside the performance metrics continuum (see Figure 1 in
Gutner and Thompson 2010), it is difficult to compare the performance across activities.
36 Interview with senior WTO official, 31 January 2007.
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located at the lower part of the performance pyramid, there is widespread consensus
among the membership that the Secretariat is doing a good job. The reporting on
Members’ trade policies has gained in quality, not least because Members have
stopped micro-managing this activity since the second half of the 1990s.38 The
Division handling trade policy reviews has not only increased its autonomy
incrementally, its workload has also been affected by growing membership and
output requirements stipulated in the WTO treaties. By contrast, if we turn our
attention to the negotiation platform, which can be situated in the upper part of the
performance pyramid, we observe a weak role of the Secretariat and little output in
the last 15 years. This calls for a counterfactual analysis as to the effects of
increasing the role of a supranational actor (the DG, the Secretariat, or chairs) given
existing decision-making procedures (see Elsig and Cottier 2011). Some initial
attempts in counterfactual analysis show that increasing the Secretariat’s role might
not suffice to remedy the situation, as a number of structural factors have changed
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and affect today’s prospects
of cooperation within the multilateral trading system (Elsig and Cottier 2011).
5.2 Performance Assessment and the Role of Information
What we learn from business studies is that information on process or output is a key
factor for performance assessment (see also Weaver 2010). In short, organizations
need information to manage performance. Yet, the concept of information does not
transfer easily from the world of business to IOs. I posit that performance
assessments through evaluations are least contentious when they focus on process-
based performance metrics, yet as we move up towards outcome-based performance,
evaluations become highly politicized. Below, I discuss the relationship between
information, evaluation and performance in the four mandated areas.
In regards to technical assistance and training activities, evaluations of project-
related tasks are frequently carried out internally and externally. An internal
methodology to monitor and evaluate the technical assistance programs was put
into place in 2002 with the launch of a Technical Cooperation Audit.39 In addition, a
consortium of non-governmental organizations was mandated in 2005 to conduct a
first review of WTO-provided training and technical assistance.40 The report gave
overall a positive assessment. Suggestions and recommendations did not address
highly politicized issues and were largely targeted at increasing the quality of
teaching, enhancing co-operation with other agencies, and outsourcing some tasks to
non-governmental groups.41
40 The mandate (terms of reference: TOR) focused on assessing the WTO’s comparative advantage vis-à-
vis other agencies, the relevance for participants, the efficiency and management of the overall training
and technical assistance, Strategic Review of WTO-provided Training and Technical Assistance (TRTA),
WT/COMTD/W/152 and WT/COMTD/W/153.
41 The suggestion to outsource is not surprising given the interests of the organizations which evaluators
represented.
38 Interview with senior WTO official, 29 January 2007.
39 Notice to the staff on the Evaluation Methodology for Monitoring and Evaluating the Technical
Assistance Activities (Office(02)40).
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In the domain of implementation and regime management, information features
prominently. In order for implementation-related Committees to perform well, the
output depends on the quality of information submitted to the organization by the
parties themselves. More active information gathering by the Secretariat in order to
increase transparency of national trade policies is done through the TPRM. This area
lends itself more easily to internal and external performance assessment, yet no
initiatives have thus far materialized.
Whereas increased information and transparency is generally accepted in regime
management and technical assistance, this is less clear-cut when the analysis turns to
negotiations and litigation.42 In the area of negotiations, the system has become more
transparent, not least due to the growing voices of developing countries following the
failed Ministerial in Seattle. A set of incremental changes to address internal
transparency were implemented to encourage participation of the weaker actors within
the organization. In addition, external transparency of the organization’s work has
increased over time. Yet, a lower degree of information and transparency also serve
strategic interests as actors attempt to gain from the existence of information
asymmetries. Negotiating parties may wish not to reveal their positions and use
“private” information as a bargaining chip.43 A related controversial question is
whether more transparency increases or decreases performance. As Stasavage (2004)
has argued, increased transparency throughout the negotiation process and public
knowledge of country positions can lead to poor performance. More transparency
increases audience costs at home and pushes negotiators to engage in posturing, to
follow defensive negotiation strategies and to offer fewer concessions.44 It is not
surprising that calls for internal evaluation of negotiation processes are seldom heard.45
And, the few noteworthy efforts of trade diplomats to engage in reform discussions
focus on incremental changes related to improving existing processes (Ismail 2009).
The relationship among information, evaluation and performance in the context of
dispute settlement has received little attention from the international relations
community. International trade lawyers have dominated the scholarly debate on this
question (e.g., Van den Bossche and Alexovicova 2005). Lawyers’ discourse on
information has focused on participation and procedural issues, such as the role of
third parties, the information a party to a conflict is asked to submit to the panels and
to the AB, or the treatment of confidential business information (see Weiss 2007:
1580–2). Some experts suggest that a too high a degree of confidentiality is
detrimental for a legal system and in order to enhance legitimacy (and greater public
support), the process needs less secrecy (Sutherland et al. 2004). In this respect, the
Sutherland Report has advocated opening the legal hearings to the public; this
44 There exists a related argument on the effects of increased legalization and de facto greater transparency
in the WTO. This in turn empowers import-competing groups and reduces Members’ ambitions to engage
in further liberalization through the WTO (Goldstein and Martin 2000).
45 A recent evaluation that also included an assessment of decision-making processes was mandated by former
DG Supachai Panitchpakdi (Sutherland et al. 2004). Yet, PPs did not pay much attention to the report.
43 The Secretariat is closely watched by the PPs to make sure that it doesn’t engage in simulation exercises
on expected effects of regulatory changes on trade flows and national welfare. Simulations are mainly
carried out by Members and the results are usually not shared among contracting parties.
42 “Evaluations” of these activities quickly turn political and are mainly done by insiders of the system
(e.g., negotiations among Members to change decision-making rules, reforming dispute settlement).
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“would be consistent with the standard practice of many international and national
tribunals” (Davey 2005: 326). While many developing countries have been reluctant
to do so, there is an emerging practice of allowing more public access to hearings
(Ehring 2008). In terms of evaluation, the DSU is de facto undergoing an internal
assessment by the PPs following the traditional practice of trade diplomacy. In
parallel to the current Doha Round negotiations, WTO Members are reviewing the
functioning of the DSU.
5.3 Aggregating Performance: Trickle Up, Canceling Out or Second Best?
A final question raised by Gutner and Thompson (2010) is whether process
performance will automatically translate into outcome performance leading to a sort
of trickle up effect. In relation to aggregation, I suggest some caution as to assuming
a linear relationship between various performance outputs (see also Lipson 2010).
Within the organization, there are some clear limits for agent activities defined by the
member-driven character of the organization and the nature of its tasks. In areas of
technical assistance and capacity building (e.g., satisfaction of users) and
implementation (providing up-to-date and correct information to the Members), the
work of the Secretariat can contribute to overall success and good performance of
the organization. One can assume a trickle up effect from implementation and
technical assistance towards positive aggregate performance.46 Yet, the overall
contribution to explaining macro performance appears limited.
The aggregation of performance is less clear-cut in relation to the middle and
upper half of the performance pyramid. Important trade-offs exist. While legal
agents in the dispute settlement system (e.g., AB members, panelists or the legal
division) might aspire to clarify principles, engage in doctrine building, opt for an
active interpretation of ambiguous wording, or setting a precedent, they are also
concerned with principals’ preferences.47 The latter applies to the acceptance of legal
decisions, but also speaks to the risk of negative consequences in the area of
negotiations. This negotiation-litigation tension has characterized the WTO system
in recent years and has weighed heavily on performance. An alleged imbalance
between rule-making and litigation has been lamented (Cottier and Takenoshita
2003). Thus, given the constraints imposed by the member-driven nature of the
organization, some agents might be willing to settle for a second-best solution. In
this sense, those called upon to act as “judge” in a given trade conflict might opt to
“freeze” the dispute or attempt to de-escalate it. In particular in relation to panel
reports, it is not unusual to see balanced reports that uphold legal claims for both
litigating parties (see Horn and Mavroidis 2008). Such a strategic underperformance
47 While it may seem counterintuitive, some AB members feel unease because their decisions cannot
easily be overturned by member states due to existing high thresholds for re-interpreting AB
recommendations or for creating new rules and obligations following consensual decision-making
procedure. This situation places enormous responsibility on their shoulders (see Pollack 2007: 7).
46 A special problem in WTO-sponsored workshops and training activities relates to job fluctuations
among participants. A significant number of workshop participants leave government or move within
governmental departments following their training. This affects the overall impact of technical assistance
related to trade policy.
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might be intended not to offend key Members within the system. This is another
example of principal costs that have been overlooked in the literature.
In conclusion, effective aggregation (or trickling up) in the context of the WTO is
hampered by the institutional milieu that allows subtle forms of interference by
Members. Therefore, agents opt to “work-to-the-rule” as a result of principals’ direct
and indirect influence over their work. Thus rather than focusing on internal and
bureaucratic obstacles to overall performance, we should pay more attention to
external preferences that are imported into the system through the Members’
Geneva-based representatives (PPs).
6 Conclusions
One of the implicit findings from the above analysis is the difficulty of turning to
self-assessments or third party evaluations in the WTO context. The lack of
evaluations further suggests that the type of work that the WTO carries out could
explain some of the systemic reluctance to engage in performance assessment. In
comparison with many other IOs in the fields of development assistance, financial
stability (see Weaver 2010), disease prevention, or peace-keeping operations (see
Lipson 2010), measuring the WTO’s services is even more tricky. The WTO does
not deliver easily measurable products and it is not in the business of providing
substantial financial transfers to achieve defined goals. The WTO is part of those
organizations that are engaged in regulatory standard setting with important
distributional effects and that offer platforms of dispute settlement. These types of
activities, as this article has shown, lack easily available performance measures and
thus pose an acute “eye of the beholder” problem. In the context of the WTO, the
difficulty for finding acceptable performance indicators increases as we move from
the process side to the output side.
This article has tried to unpack the WTO and to emphasize the complex agency
milieu that affects the performance of the organization. In doing so, the article
addresses an expectation gap as to what the system in its current design is able to
perform. The performance in the area of negotiations has been modest at best when
judging the outcome over the past 15 years. In addition, recent studies on the WTO
have provided us with evidence that the role of the Secretariat has decreased over
time, and that the mantra of the “member-driven” organization has become even
more dominant (Sutherland et al. 2004, Elsig 2010). Member dominance in
combination with decision-making procedures based on consensus and relying on
the “single undertaking” approach has led to deadlock in negotiations.48 Finally,
WTO Members have come to realize that the business of making rules (positive
integration) is much more difficult than the classical reciprocal game of lowering
tariffs (negative integration) (Fearon 1998). As a result, voices within the member-
ship have increased that consider the current system for making decisions inadequate
48 The single undertaking principle means that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This approach
ties together a diverse set of negotiation issues, excludes early harvest of agreed negotiation outcomes, and
makes a final (package) agreement only possible if it is acceptable to all Members.
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to tackle upcoming challenges. Getting more help from the Secretariat is one option
that could be explored in this context.
Yet, a cautionary note is in order. Delegating power to agents within the
organization (in particular in the field of negotiations) will not prove sufficient to
overcome the current deadlock. Delegation has to go hand in hand with a broader
effort to redesign the system (e.g., on decision-making, voting procedures, moving
away from the single undertaking) (for a detailed discussion, see Elsig and Cottier
2011). The overall paradox of reform, however, is that Members have first to agree
to delegate power; a difficult issue in light of the existing consensual processes of
decision-making and reluctance by Members socialized in a member-driven
environment to give up some of their prerogatives as principals.
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